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WHO IS A FAMILY: COHABITATION, 





The emergence of cohabitation as an alternative to the traditional 
form of the family has left the need for legislative reform. Currently, 
cohabitants must resort to equitable claims as they do not have 
access to the property sharing regime designated for married 
spouses. The definition of “family” requires reformulation to include 
cohabitation. This reformulation must then be reflected in Ontario’s 
Family Law Act through the adoption of an opt-out regime. This 
reform appropriately balances the values of autonomy and equality 
and creates certainty, predictability, and consistency in the law of 
Ontario. This paper addresses the possibility of reform through the 




Have you ever been told that whom you choose to marry is one of the 
most important decisions you will have to make? Marriage in Ontario 
continues to enjoy a “uniquely privileged status.”1 That is, by choosing 
to marry, an individual acquires specific legal rights and obligations.2 
The social perception of what constitutes a “family” has changed over 
the past fifty years as there has been a consistent rise in the rate of 
cohabitation. “Cohabitation,” for the purposes of this paper, is defined 
as an intimate relationship involving two persons living together 
without being legally married. Some provinces, including Nova Scotia 
and, more recently, British Columbia, have adopted legislation to 
                                                 
 
1 Winifred Holland, “Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The 
Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation” (2000) 17:1 Can J Fam L 114 at 
125. 
2 Ibid at 121. 





reflect the changing structure of the family. Complete reform in 
Ontario, however, has yet to occur. The family should be redefined in 
Ontario to include cohabiting families, which may or may not involve 
children. This redefinition of family ought to be reflected in family 
policy and the Family Law Act3 by adopting an opt-out regime similar 
to that adopted most recently in British Columbia. 
 
Marriage was the only legally recognized family form in the 
1960s.4 Cohabitants were excluded from the rights and obligations that 
attached automatically upon marriage.5 The exclusivity of particular 
legal rights and obligations within the area of family law has been, and 
continues to be, a source of frustration for “non-normative” family 
arrangements.6 Courts, especially in Ontario, have been slow to extend 
legal recognition to cohabiting couples. Prior to the transformation of 
the institution of marriage, same-sex couples found it incredibly 
difficult to “assert the legitimacy of their families.”7 Although not the 
focus of this paper, this issue was clearly demonstrated by the difficulty 
same-sex partners faced when arguing for automatic parental status in 
terms of entitlement to birth registration.8 
 
Over the past fifty years, legal scholars and policymakers have 
attempted to tackle the issue of extending the rights and obligations 
                                                 
 
3  RSO 1990, c F-3 [OFLA]. 
4 Supra note 1 at para 127. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned 
Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). 
7 Ibid at 29. 
8 Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary 
(Concord: Captus Press Inc, 2012) [Mossman, Commentary]. 





associated with marriage to cohabitation.9 In Ontario, many of these 
rights and obligations are still unique to married spouses, but support 
obligations under the Family Law Act have been imposed on 
cohabitants.10 Policymakers have shifted the financial burden from the 
State to the family, a theme that recurs throughout family law 
legislation. Unfortunately, the definition of “spouse” for the purposes 
of property rights has not yet been extended to include cohabitants in 
Ontario. Cohabitants must resort to equitable claims, an area of law 
that is complex and lacks certainty. It is in this sense that these 
equitable claims have “serious limitations as a tool for the fair 
allocation of property between cohabiting spouses.”11 
 
The functional similarity between marriage and cohabitation is 
one of the main pillars supporting the argument for legislative reform. 
According to some scholars, the difference between marriage and 
cohabitation is minimal.12 Marriage and cohabitation encompass “a 
range of relationships, some characterized by various forms of 
dependency, while others involve spouses who are quite independent, 
financially and otherwise.”13 In fact, similar needs arise for cohabitants 
and married spouses upon the breakdown of their respective 
relationships (i.e. support). 
 
The definition of family has been historically synonymous 
with marriage. This view of the family is inherently flawed. When one 
considers who is a family, marriage ought not to be a necessary 
condition. The definition of the family should focus on what families 
                                                 
 
9  Holland, supra note 1; Zheng Wu, Cohabitation: An Alternative Form of 
Family Living (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
10 OFLA supra note 3, s 29. 
11 Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC), Report on Family Property Law 
(Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 3940, [OLRC, Family Property Law]. 
12  Holland, supra note 1; OLRC, Family Property Law, supra note 11. 
13 Holland, supra note 1 at 151. 





do as opposed to what they look like. The family, or more specifically 
the nuclear family, is often referred to as the basic social unit. The 
nuclear family cannot be said to require marriage, as it is defined as 
being composed of two parents and their children. Cohabitation and 
marriage, therefore, are simply different forms of the nuclear family. 
As such, there is a need for legislative reform to recognize the 
variations of the nuclear family. 
 
The Ontario legislative regime currently does not recognize 
the contribution made by cohabitants to their families as it does through 
the redistribution of economic resources upon the dissolution of a 
marriage. According to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, 
 
Cohabitation is slowly but surely becoming a substitute 
for legal marriage as a social institution where children 
are born, raised, and socialized to become members of 
our society.14 
 
It follows from this reasoning that cohabitation poses a greater threat 
to the institution of marriage than the high incidence of divorce.15 This 
is because while both undermine the permanence of marriage, only 
cohabitation can provide an alternative to marriage.16 That is, as noted 
earlier, cohabitation is simply a variation of what many view as the 
traditional nuclear family. If cohabitation is viewed as an alternative to 
marriage, or, rather, a different form of the nuclear family, as opposed 
to a precursor to marriage (i.e. “trial marriage”), then the extension of 
the legislative regime to cohabiting couples is required to protect the 
vulnerable people in such relationships. 
 
                                                 
 
14 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 at para 125, 221 DLR 
(4th) 1 [Walsh]. 
15 Wu, supra note 9 at 4. 
16 Ibid. 





This paper aims to discuss cohabitation with a view towards 
the possibility of legislative reform in Ontario. First, statistics 
respecting cohabitation will confirm familial trends in Canadian 
society and provide a more accurate understanding of who exactly 
chooses to cohabit. Second, the factors that influence an individual’s 
choice to cohabit will be explored. These factors will provide the 
framework to discuss policy rationales for extending rights and 
obligations of married spouses to cohabitants. Third, the current 
legislative scheme in Ontario as set out in the Family Law Act and the 
issues associated with this scheme will be reviewed. Fourth, possible 
resolutions will be proposed by focusing on alternative legislative 
schemes adopted in other provinces. After consideration of all the 
above, this paper will advocate for the adoption of an opt-out approach 
similar to that adopted in British Columbia. It is important to note that 
the terms “cohabitation” and “common-law” will be used 
interchangeably for the purposes of this paper. 
 
WHO CHOOSES TO COHABIT: STATISTICS AND TRENDS 
 
General Statistics  
 
Approximately 16.7 per cent of all census families in Canada were 
common-law couples in 2011.17 In comparison, common-law couples 
composed only 5.6 per cent of all census families in Canada in 1981 
and 13.8 per cent in 2001.18 The percentage of cohabiting couples has 
increased at least three-fold since Statistics Canada began gathering 
data in 1981 with respect to cohabitation/common-law unions.19 This 
                                                 
 
17 Statistics Canada, Portrait of Families and Living Arrangements in Canada, 
Catalogue No 98-312—X201101 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, September 
2012) at 5 [Statistics Canada, Portrait of Families].  
18 Ibid. 
19 Statistics Canada, Fifty Years of Families in Canada: 19612011, by Anne 
Milan & Nora Bohnert, Catalogue No 98-312-X2011003 (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, September 2012) at 2 [Statistics Canada, Fifty Years]. 





trend signifies that the conception of the modern family ought to 
include cohabiting couples, as these unions are increasingly becoming 
an alternative to marriage, the traditional form of the family. 
 
The rate of cohabitation varies across Canada’s ten provinces 
and three territories.20 Quebec has the highest rate of cohabitation 
relative to Canada’s nine other provinces. In 2011, 31.5 per cent of all 
census families in Quebec were common-law couples.21 The lowest 
rate of cohabitation, 10.9 per cent, was found in Ontario.22 The great 
discrepancy between the rate of cohabitation in Quebec and the other 
nine provinces is often explained by the differences in values between 
Quebec and the English provinces.23 In fact, the regional patterns 
among Canada’s English provinces are less salient as there is only a 
3.3 per cent deviation among the provinces with respect to the rate of 
cohabitation.24 
 
The rate of cohabitation is considerably higher in Canada’s 
three territories—Nunavut (32.7 per cent), Northwest Territories (28.7 
per cent) and Yukon (25.1 per cent)—in comparison to the English 
provinces.25 When interpreting these statistics, however, it is important 
to take into consideration that “the population base in the territories is 
relatively small.”26 Nonetheless, cohabitation seems to be a “popular 
lifestyle choice among Canada’s indigenous populations.”27 
 
                                                 
 
20 Supra note 17 at 6. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Wu, supra note 9 at 48. 
24 Statistics Canada, Fifty Years, supra note 19 at 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Wu, supra note 9 at 47. 
27 Ibid. 





Who Cohabits?  
 
The regional patterns with respect to cohabitation reveal significant 
differences in Canadian society. First, it is apparent that cohabitation 
is more prevalent among Aboriginal people. Second, those residing in 
Quebec are also more open to cohabit in comparison to individuals in 
Canada’s English provinces. Past these broad generalizations, 
however, it is important to further explore which segments of the 
population are more open to and have higher rates of cohabitation. 
 
First, cohabitation is particularly prevalent among Canadians 
in their twenties and thirties.28 Economic factors may play a significant 
role in the decision to cohabit during this period of time. In addition, 
some scholars suggest that the prevalence of cohabitation among those 
in their twenties and thirties can be partially explained by the fact that 
cohabitation is a precursor to marriage.29 That is, cohabitation is 
viewed by these young adults as a “trial marriage” as opposed to an 
alternative to marriage.30 This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that more than two-thirds of cohabitees have never been previously 
married.31 
 
Second, “common-law relationships are also increasingly 
popular among people who enter a second union.”32 Over 25 per cent 
of cohabitants have been previously divorced.33 In fact,  
 
                                                 
 
28 Ibid at 1. 
29 Holland, supra note 1 at 159. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wu, supra note 9 at 1. 
32 Berend Hovius, “Property Division for Unmarried Cohabitees in the Common 
Law Provinces” (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 175 at 175.  
33 Wu, supra note 9 at 1. 





 while Statistics Canada estimated that barely 8 per cent 
of women ranging in age from 50 to 59 had chosen 
a common-law relationship as their first union, 
approximately 20 per cent of them had been or would 
eventually be involved in a common-law relationship.34 
 
It follows that there are at least two entirely different segments of the 
population who choose to cohabit. These groups may have different 
values when entering into these new relationships given their past 
experiences or lack thereof. 
 
Third, approximately half of cohabiting unions include 
children, “either born to the cohabiting couple or brought into the 
family from previous relationships.”35 The rise in non-marital fertility 
and the decline in teen fertility are consistent with the theory that much 
of the “increase in non-marital fertility in recent decades may have 
been largely a consequence of the increase in non-marital 
cohabitation.”36 The presence of children in a cohabiting relationship 
adds a different dimension to this discussion because another party 
must be considered upon the breakdown of that relationship. 
Furthermore, if a child is brought into a cohabiting union from a 
previous relationship, the relationship may become structured in a 
particular manner that protects the child’s interests. 
 
The above characteristics provide a general framework to 
discuss policy issues with a view toward legislative reform. There are 
other characteristics that may have a lesser impact on this discussion 
but remain significant. Studies have shown that men are more willing 
than women to consider cohabitation as a viable alternative to 
                                                 
 
34 Hovius, supra note 32 at 175. 
35 Wu, supra note 9 at 1. 
36 Ibid at 88. 





marriage.37 In addition, higher levels of education and labour force 
participation are positively correlated with one’s willingness to 
consider cohabitation.38 These additional characteristics are relevant to 
policy issues such as autonomy, equality, and the protection of the 
vulnerable.  
 
When considering the possibility of reform, it is crucial to take 
into consideration those affected by the reform and analyze the effect 
of such reform on these groups of individuals. It is clear from the above 
that there are two distinct groups of cohabitees that will be affected by 
legislative reform—those who have not been previously married 
(never-married cohabitants), and those who have been previously 
married (post-marital cohabitants). In addition, it is crucial to take into 
consideration whether there are children involved in the relationship 
and whether they are brought into the relationship or born to the 
cohabiting couple. 
 
Breakdown of the Relationship   
 
“Cohabitations are often short-lived.”39 In fact, over half of cohabiting 
relationships end within three years.40 This, however, may be 
misinterpreted if the reasons for ending the cohabiting relationship are 
not considered. A cohabiting relationship may end due to separation, 
death of one of the cohabitees, or marriage. In fact,  
 
these unions are more likely to end in marriage than in 
separation: about one-third of cohabiting couples marry 
each other within three years of cohabitation, while 
                                                 
 
37 Anne Milan, “Would You Live Common Law”, Canadian Social Trends (9 
September 2003) 2 at 2. 
38 Ibid at 3. 
39 Wu, supra note 9 at 1. 
40 Ibid. 





another quarter dissolve their relationships through 
separation.41 
 
These statistics have caused legal scholars to debate the meaning of 
cohabiting relationships. One position is that cohabitation is a 
precursor to marriage or a “trial marriage.” The other position taken by 
legal academics is that cohabitation is a substitute for marriage. It 
follows from this latter position that those who choose to cohabit are 
fundamentally different from those who choose to marry. 
 
There is evidence supporting each position, but the second 
position is more troubling legislatively. If two persons form a 
cohabiting relationship, one may wish to marry while the other does 
not. This power imbalance is not equalized by the current legislative 
regime in Ontario as the vulnerable cohabitee (the one who wishes to 
marry) is left unprotected by legislation. If both cohabitees see their 
union as a substitute to marriage, they are in a better position to 
structure their relationship accordingly, with the knowledge that they 
do not have the same rights and obligations as married spouses. 
 
Wu points out that “[t]here is no doubt that cohabiting unions 
are more vulnerable and less stable than marital unions.”42 Given the 
fact that approximately 25 per cent of cohabiting relationships dissolve 
through separation within three years, the legal rights and obligations 
of cohabitees are increasingly significant. “Almost 90 per cent of first 
marriages last at least ten years, while only 12 per cent of common law 
relationships achieve a tenth anniversary.”43 The rise in cohabitation in 
combination with the above facts means that an increasing proportion 
of the population are left with little certainty upon the breakdown of 
their relationships. 
 
                                                 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 108. 
43 Hovius, supra note 32 at 176. 





The three-year mark in a cohabiting relationship can be said to 
be the defining point in the relationship. Approximately 60 per cent of 
cohabiting relationships have ended through separation or marriage by 
this point in time.44 Thus, policymakers ought to keep this timeframe 
in mind when creating an opt-out regime whereby legal rights and 
obligations automatically attach to cohabitees at a particular point in 
their relationship. 
 
WHY CHOOSE TO COHABIT: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
The emergence of cohabitation as a form of family living has led many 
academics to theorize about why this has occurred. Changing public 
attitudes and values with respect to premarital sex and the social 
institution of marriage are a contributing factor to this change in the 
modern family.45 Changing gender roles may have also contributed to 
the rise of cohabitation over the past thirty years.46 The successful 
challenge to the opposite-sex requirement with respect to the validity 
of marriage may have slowed the process of extending legal rights and 
obligations associated with marriage to those who choose to cohabit, 
as same-sex couples are no longer limited to cohabitation. The 
following discussion outlines different perspectives on the rise of 
cohabitation. It is critical to understand the rise of cohabitation in 
Canadian society to determine whether these families ought to have the 
same rights and obligations as married spouses. 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Economic Perspective on Cohabitation 
 
Individuals are “faced with the necessity to make choices; and in 
making choices, they try as best they can to maximize welfare as they 
                                                 
 
44 Wu, supra note 9 at 1. 
45 Ibid at 2. 
46 Ibid. 





conceive it.”47 That is, these choices are made to maximize current and 
future benefits. This means that individuals attempt to “anticipate the 
uncertain consequences of their choices.”48 It is suggested by 
economists such as Gary Becker that individuals choose to marry only 
if they will gain from marriage.49 Traditionally, individuals who chose 
to marry would have a two-fold benefit—at home and in the labour 
market. 
 
Societal norms, attitudes, and values are constantly changing. 
Although gender barriers still exist within the labour market, these 
barriers are not as great as they once were. Gender roles have changed 
drastically, and such change can be traced back to World War II. In 
fact, women’s economic independence has reduced the necessity of 
marriage: 
 
Increases in women’s earning power and participation 
in the labour market would discourage individuals, 
particularly women, from entering into marriage 
because of reduced economic gain from the union.50 
 
Cohabitation is an attractive alternative to marriage for those who seek 
to be partnered with another but wish to pursue their careers. It offers 
individuals the benefits of marriage, such as the pooling of resources 
and the sharing of residence, with less commitment. 
 
Implicit in this theoretical perspective is the notion that 
individuals are consciously choosing to avoid the social institution of 
                                                 
 
47 Ibid at 10. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Gary Becker, “A Theory of Marriage” in Theodore W Schulz, ed, 
Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) 299, online: The National 
Bureau of Economic Research <www.nber.org/chapters/c2970.pdf>. 
50 Wu, supra note 9 at 13. 





marriage and the legal consequences that flow from it. That is, they are 
actively avoiding long-term commitment and the legislative provisions 
that require the sharing of the “fruits of the relationship, which are the 
result of joint efforts during the relationship.”51 The question then 
becomes whether both parties are actively choosing not to marry. The 
Family Law Act must create a fair compromise that both allows 
individuals to structure their relationships to fall within or outside its 
scope and to protect a vulnerable party from being exploited by the 
other. 
 
Changing Societal Norms and Values: The Sociological 
Perspective  
 
The sociological perspective takes a more macro-level approach with 
respect to the family. According to this perspective, norms, values, and 
beliefs play a significant role in regulating social behaviour.52 These 
norms, values, and beliefs do not remain static, as they adapt to various 
social and structural changes within society.53 
 
Marriage and cohabitation are social behaviours to 
which socially defined values are attached. Thus, the 
values and norms concerning union behaviour may vary 
across cultures and historical periods.54 
 
This variance across cultures is demonstrated by the aforementioned 
difference in the rate of cohabitation between Quebec and the English 
provinces. However, this difference does not explain the general 
emergence of cohabitation as a form of family living. 
 
                                                 
 
51 Holland, supra note 1 at 151. 
52 Wu, supra note 9 at 20. 
53 Ibid at 16. 
54 Ibid. 





Over the past fifty years there has been a significant 
ideological shift in Western societies that is often referred to as the rise 
of individualism.55 This shift has “gradually shifted the norms from 
family-centred orientations to relatively more self-oriented pursuits.”56 
These changes have significantly contributed to the changes in the 
traditional form of the family. Cohabitation offers those in search of 
“self-fulfillment” a less permanent and committed relationship, while 
still offering some of the benefits of marriage, such as the pooling of 
resources and the sharing of a residence. 
 
This perspective seems to advance the position against reform. 
That is, if those who enter cohabiting relationships do so to further 
themselves while avoiding the legal rights and obligations that 
automatically attach upon marriage, then the autonomy of cohabitees 
ought to be respected. However, it is neither fair nor responsible to 
generalize to all cohabitants. In fact, many individuals believe that 
cohabitation offers the same legal protection as marriage after a certain 
period of time. If the intention of the cohabitees is to form a family, 
then there ought to be no difference between marriage and cohabitation 
after the three-year mark. If this is not their intention, one may argue 
that the onus must be placed on the party attempting to avoid inclusion 
in the legislative regime—an opt-out approach. 
 
THE CURRENT REGIME IN ONTARIO: THE FAMILY LAW 
ACT 
 
The Two Definitions of “Spouse”  
 
Ontario’s Family Law Act provides two separate definitions of 
“spouse.” The first, which I will refer to as the “standard definition,” 
excludes cohabiting individuals.57 The second, which I will refer to as 
                                                 
 
55 Ibid at 17. 
56 Ibid. 
57 OFLA, supra note 3, s 1(1). 





the “expanded definition,” includes both married individuals and those 
who have cohabited “continuously for a period of not less than three 
years” or “are in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the 
natural or adoptive parents of a child.”58 
 
The standard definition of “spouse” is largely self-explanatory. 
In contrast, case law is required to interpret the expanded definition. 
First, the term “continuously” has been interpreted by the court 
flexibly. It is not only a question of geography but a question of 
intent.59 One of the cohabitees must intend to permanently sever the 
relationship or the court may interpret the relationship as one with 
some degree of continuity.60 Second, “of some permanence” has also 
been interpreted flexibly by the courts. The court held in Hazlewood v. 
Kent: 
 
One of the strongest indicia of an intention to be treated 
as a family is the existence of children born to the 
couple. When this is combined with an element of 
financial support by one party to the other, an altering 
of the roles in the relationship as a result of the birth of 
the children and some time spent together on a regular 
basis, this relationship should be considered to be 
‘cohabitation.’61 
 
It is clear that the legislature and courts attempt to cast a wide net with 
respect to the expanded definition of “spouse.” 
 
                                                 
 
58 Ibid, s 29. 
59 Sullivan v Letnik, 5 RFL (4th) 313, 1994 CarswellOnt 420 (Ont UFC) at para 
24. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Hazlewood v Kent, [2000] OJ No 5263 (Sup Ct J) at para 38, [Hazlewood]. 





When Are the Definitions Applicable: Support Obligations and 
the Exclusion of Cohabiting Couples from the Property Sharing 
Regime 
 
The standard definition of “spouse” is used for the entirety of the Act 
except for Part III, support obligations. Thus, those who cohabit will 
fall within the scope of Part III of the Act if they have either cohabited 
continuously for at least three years or are in a relationship of some 
permanence and have children. Cohabitees do not have access to the 
property sharing regime that is available to married spouses upon the 
breakdown of their relationship or the rights to possession of the 
matrimonial home. Ontario’s Family Law Act, in its current form, 
forces the financially vulnerable party to resort to equitable claims 
upon the breakdown of their relationship. Thus, Ontario adopts an opt-
in approach as cohabiting couples may enter into a cohabitation 
agreement that addresses all the issues that would otherwise be 
addressed if married. 
 
RATIONALIZING THE TWO DEFINITIONS OF “SPOUSE”: 
HIDDEN POLICIES 
 
The use of two distinctly different definitions of “spouse” within the 
same Act is complex and may be confusing to cohabiting couples. On 
the one hand, policymakers are claiming that cohabitees and married 
spouses are equivalent, at least for the purposes of support obligations. 
On the other hand, policymakers differentiate between married spouses 
and cohabitees for all other purposes, including property sharing. The 
State’s financial interest at stake in this decision plays a decisive role 
in these different definitions. The rationale that underlies the use of the 
expanded definition for support obligations is two-fold. First, and 
foremost, the State places the financial burden of ongoing support on 
former family members as opposed to the “public purse.” Second, the 
State protects the more vulnerable party of the cohabiting relationship 





from exploitation by entitling them to support, if they meet the criteria 
as set out in the Act.62 
 
It is the first of these rationales, the State’s financial interests, 
that is more disconcerting. The legislature prefers to place the financial 
obligation for support on former family members as opposed to the 
State. This desire to lessen the pull on the public’s purse strings is often 
referred to as a “hidden policy,” as it often falls outside the articulated 
reasoning behind legislative decisions. In Nova Scotia (Attorney 
General) v. Walsh, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé identifies the “desire to 
avoid diverting funds from the public purse in order to support 
separated individuals.”63 As a consequence, former family members 
often have “significant ongoing responsibilities to alleviate 
vulnerability among some family members after separation.”64 
 
The ongoing responsibility to alleviate economic vulnerability 
of former family members ensures that contact between former family 
members is maintained. This ongoing responsibility to former family 
members has led to the “post-separation” family.65 The statistics 
regarding the post-separation family are alarming. In fact, 
 
. . . the end of a marriage or common-law relationship 
increased the likelihood of poverty substantially. For 
those who were married and had children, the risk of 
poverty rose from 3.1 per cent to 37.6 per cent after 
divorce or separation. . . . In 198286, the family 
income of women (adjusted for changes in family size) 
                                                 
 
62 OFLA, supra note 3, s 29. 
63 Supra note 14 at para 116. 
64 Mossman, Commentary, supra note 8 at 339. 
65 Ibid. 





dropped by an average of about 30 per cent in the year 
after their marriage ended.66 
 
These financially vulnerable family members emerge after separation, 
as one household has now been split into two and the cost of living 
nearly doubles. The dependency, which was once hidden under the 
cover of an intact family, emerges upon the dissolution of the family 
unit.67 “Separation or divorce thus ‘unmasks’ the dependency for 
which intact families provide support.”68 
 
The use of the expanded definition of “spouse” for the 
purposes of Part III of the Family Law Act thereby expands the number 
of “post-separation” family units. The question is whether the policy 
decision to place the burden so heavily on the family is justified. This 
is the point at which the distinction in legislation between cohabitants 
and married spouses becomes questionable. That is, if cohabitants and 
married spouses are equivalent with respect to support obligations, it is 
difficult to justify the differentiation when it comes to other sections of 
the Act, particularly property. Put simply, if cohabitants are 
functionally similar to married spouses for the purposes of support, 
then they must be considered functionally similar for all purposes. 
 
THE MARRIAGE-COHABITATION DEBATE: THEMES, 
ISSUES, AND POLICY 
 
Legal scholars have advocated for the extension of the legal regime 
that deals with the economic consequences of marriage to those who 
cohabit. Careful consideration must be given to the various themes, 
issues, and general policies that underlie this marriage-cohabitation 
                                                 
 
66 T Lempriere, “A New Look at Poverty” (1992) 16 Perception 18 at 1920, 
cited in Mary Jane Mossman, “Running Hard to Stand Still: The Paradox of 
Family Law Reform” (1994) 17 Dal LJ 5 at 6 [Mossman, “Running Hard”]. 
67 Mossman, Commentary, supra note 8 at 339. 
68 Ibid at 338339. 





debate. The Supreme Court of Canada has provided its divided view 
on the marriage-cohabitation debate in two significant cases: Nova 
Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh and, more recently, Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. A.69 The division of the Court in both cases has 
provided scholars with a valuable perspective on the themes and issues 
that are involved in the marriage-cohabitation debate. These themes 
and issues will be dealt with in turn. 
 
Functional Similarity  
 
Family law ought to be viewed from a functionalist perspective. That 
is, policymakers must focus on what families do and take account of 
the functions of families.70 This is in sharp contrast to the familialism 
approach, which focuses on how families should look or behave.71 The 
familialism approach has been used by courts to “preclude some 
households from being regarded as ‘families’ even when their 
members wish to be so defined.”72 The functionalist perspective is 
proactive. It adapts to changes in the form of the family by considering 
the functions performed by households that wish to be considered 
“families.” By contrast, the familialist perspective is reactive and the 
perception of what the family ought to look like will change only after 
legislative reform.  
 
When focusing on what families do and how they behave, it 
must be concluded that cohabitation and marriage are functionally 
similar. This argument only becomes more persuasive the “longer the 
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cohabiting relationship lasts, especially where children are involved.”73 
As noted by Kuffner, 
 
Common-law couples often share many of the same 
characteristics as married couples: shared 
accommodations, pooling resources, emotional and 
financial interdependence, and the raising of children. 
Some cohabitants have become financially dependent 
on their spouse, similar to some married spouses. 
Consequently, cohabitants often suffer similar 
hardships upon breakdown of such relationships.74 
 
If cohabitation is functionally similar to marriage, it seems reasonable 
that cohabitees have access to the same rights and remedies available 
to married spouses upon the breakdown of their respective 
relationships. 
 
The above argument was addressed by Justice Bastarache, 
speaking for the majority in Walsh. He held that although there is a 
great deal of similarity between marriage and cohabitation, one cannot 
ignore the heterogeneity that exists within the latter group.75 This 
reasoning is flawed. Although there is considerable heterogeneity 
among cohabiting individuals, a similar level of heterogeneity exists 
among married spouses. Thus, it seems illogical to differentiate 
between cohabitation and marriage because “[w]hen we compare 
cohabitation and modern-day marriage there are few distinctions.”76 
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The above-mentioned argument seems to commence its 
analysis from an illogical starting point. That is, it commences its 
analysis by differentiating between marriage and cohabitation, rather 
than analyzing what constitutes a family. If the Court had commenced 
its analysis by answering this question, the reasoning of the Court 
might have been significantly different. That is, when one looks at the 
family, it is the functions performed by the family that define its 
existence. In order to consider the functions of the family it is important 
to consider its basic form—commonly referred to as the “nuclear 
family”—which is comprised of parents and their children, if any.  
 
Marriage and cohabitation are simply variations of this basic 
family unit. As such, the same rights and obligations should be 
imposed on those who choose to cohabit and those who choose to 
marry. The relevant question then becomes when to impose these rights 
and obligations on the parties who cohabit and those who marry. This 
is where the distinction between marriage and cohabitation ought to be 
made. Where the community may view the date of marriage as 
symbolizing the formation of a new family, there is no similar date for 
a cohabiting couple. Thus, the question becomes when does the 
cohabiting couple become viewed as a family. The issue of 
determining when this event occurs and, therefore, when the legal 
rights and obligations ought to be extended to a cohabiting couple is 
explored later in this paper. The reasoning of Justice Bastarache fails 
to recognize that not only is there heterogeneity among those who 
cohabit and those who are married, but there is also heterogeneity 
among the forms of the family, i.e., cohabitation and marriage. 
 
Autonomy: Whose Choice Is It?  
  
Personal autonomy is a value that underlies the equality guarantee in 
section 15 of the Charter.77 Thus, courts must respect the choices 
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“made by individuals in the exercise of that autonomy.”78 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has emphasized the importance of personal autonomy 
in both Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh and Quebec (Attorney 
General) v. A. In fact, the Court has gone so far as to hold that “[w]here 
the legislation has the effect of dramatically altering the legal 
obligations of partners, as between themselves, choice must be 
paramount.”79 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken the position that those 
who choose to marry are simultaneously deciding to adopt the legal 
rights and obligations associated with marriage.80 To cast the net so 
wide as to capture individuals who do not make this conscious choice 
and impose the same obligations on these individuals would be unfair. 
It “would be to intrude into the most personal and intimate of life 
choices by imposing a system of obligations on people who never 
consented to such a system.”81 
 
The above reasoning of the Court, in my opinion, is flawed in 
one respect—choice in terms of the family can be paramount only if 
the decision is made consciously and if it is mutual. Thus, the first 
question that must be posed is whether the decision to cohabit is a 
mutual decision. Furthermore, the choice must be a conscious one in 
which the parties are aware of the consequences that flow from that 
decision. Thus, it must also be asked whether cohabitees actually know 
their legal rights. 
 
First, the decision to cohabit is not always a mutual one. In 
some circumstances, only one of the parties may wish to avoid 
marriage due to the matrimonial obligations that automatically 
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attach.“[I]t is dangerous to assume that this motivation applies to both 
partners.”82 In this case, a power imbalance exists between the parties 
and the dependent party becomes financially vulnerable. Justice Abella 
in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. notes the flaws of an opt-in regime: 
 
A further weakness of the current opt-in system is its 
failure to recognize that the choice to formally marry is 
a mutual decision. One member of a couple can decide 
to refuse to marry or enter a civil union and thereby 
deprive the other of the benefit of needed spousal 
support when the relationship ends. In her dissenting 
reasons in Walsh, L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed that 
“[t]his results in a situation where one of the parties to 
the cohabitation relationship preserves his or her 
autonomy at the expense of the other: ‘The flip side of 
one person’s autonomy is often another’s 
exploitation.’”83 
 
In this case, it is up to the “legislature to intervene if it believes that the 
consequences of such autonomous choices give rise to social problems 
that need to be remedied.”84 Where only one party desires to avoid the 
matrimonial obligations by continuing to remain in a cohabiting 
relationship, a social problem arises as the vulnerable party requires 
protection. 
 
Second, “couples often . . . are mistaken about the rights of 
unmarried cohabitants.”85 Many individuals are under the false 
impression that they have similar rights and obligations to married 
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individuals if they are in a cohabiting relationship of some duration.86 
That is, they believe that as far as the law is concerned they are actually 
married. “The term ‘common-law marriage’ compounds this 
confusion.”87 In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., Justice Abella 
echoes these concerns as she states that those who cohabit do not 
always “turn their minds to the eventuality of separation” or are 
ignorant of the law that applies to them.88 Instead, many cohabitees 
“will just drift along, in blissful ignorance, believing that they have 
property rights, until they talk to a lawyer at the end of their 
relationship and learn the harsh truth.”89 
 
Thus, it is crucial that the legislature adopt a scheme that 
protects vulnerable individuals from both their ignorance and their 
exploitation. An opt-out regime will protect these individuals who do 
not turn their minds to their legal rights and obligations when entering 
into such a relationship. One may argue that such legislation casts too 
wide a net, capturing individuals in a scheme that they did not 
voluntarily accept. Implicit in this argument is the conviction that these 
individuals know their legal rights and can therefore mutually opt-out. 
In providing an opt-out scheme, the onus is placed on the more 
powerful party. Moreover, if an opt-out scheme is adopted as the 
default regime, the opportunity for exploitation is minimized. 
 
Knowledge and Exploitation: Finding the Delicate Balance 
Between Autonomy and the Need to Protect the Vulnerable  
 
There are three situations that may occur within a cohabiting 
relationship with respect to the couple’s knowledge of their legal rights 
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and obligations: (1) both individuals are familiar with their legal rights 
and obligations; (2) only one partner understands their legal rights and 
obligations; and (3) neither partner is familiar with their legal rights 
and obligations. It is important to weigh the values of autonomy and 
the need to protect the weaker party within the contexts of these three 
situations. A delicate balance can only be struck between these 
competing values if the contexts in which the concerns arise are 
addressed. 
 
First, if both parties are familiar with the legal rights and 
obligations of unmarried cohabitants, the parties may stand on equal 
ground. If one party wishes to marry and the other does not, a power 
imbalance will still exist. Thus, the vulnerable party will be left 
unprotected unless the couple agrees to enter into a cohabitation 
agreement. This scenario demonstrates the concerns regarding 
exploitation. Some may contest that an individual’s choice to remain 
with a partner who refuses to marry is the same as a spouse who gives 
in to insistent demands for marriage.90 Policymakers, however, must 
place the onus on the party who wishes to avoid such obligations. In 
fact, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., Justice Abella found that 
although the current opt-in regime may well be adequate for some 
cohabiting couples who enter their relationship with “sufficient 
financial security, legal information, and the deliberate intent to avoid 
the consequences of a more formal union . . . their ability to exercise 
freedom of choice can be equally protected under . . . an opt out” 
regime.91 The vulnerable party, however, requires “presumptive 
protection no less in de facto unions than in more formal ones.”92 
 
Second, the chance of exploitation is maximized in a scenario 
in which only one partner in a cohabiting relationship is familiar with 
the rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants. Placing the onus 
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on the party who seeks to avoid the legal obligations by means of an 
opt-out regime protects the vulnerable party and minimizes 
exploitation. Autonomy ought not to be synonymous with exploitation. 
One cannot stand behind the veil of autonomy to justify one’s 
exploitation of the weaker party. 
 
Third, if both parties are unaware of the rights and obligations 
of unmarried cohabitants, the vulnerable party will emerge only after 
the breakdown of the relationship. Scholars suggest that this scenario 
may be the most common among cohabitees. This is because: 
 
most couples do not engage in “crystal-ball” gazing at 
the inception of the relationship and do not have a clear 
idea which obligations they are consciously choosing to 
avoid. If they did, one would expect such couples to 
have entered into a domestic contract rather than risking 
subsequent claims based on support or unjust 
enrichment.93 
 
Many are “not aware of the distinction between Part III of the Family 
Law Act and the rights under Parts I and II until they are faced with the 
breakup of the relationships.”94 The use of the standard definition of 
“spouse” for Parts I and II of the Act, and the use of the expanded 
definition for Part III creates this confusing distinction. The creation of 
an opt-out regime would eliminate the above distinction and the use of 
two definitions of “spouse” within the same Act. Adopting an opt-out 
regime would decrease the amount of “public confusion about the 
difference between marriage and cohabitation.”95 Furthermore, the 
adoption of an opt-out regime would protect cohabitees whether they 
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are “aware of their legal rights or not,” leaving cohabitees “the freedom 
to choose not to be protected.”96 
 
Complexity and Uncertainty: Cohabitees Must Resort to 
Equitable Claims 
 
Under Ontario’s Family Law Act, cohabitees do not have access to the 
property-sharing regime included in Part I of the Act. Cohabitees must 
resort to equitable claims for the redistribution of property after the 
breakdown of their relationship. These claims of unjust enrichment are 
unpredictable, creating a sense of uncertainty in the law. 
 
It is clear that the doctrine of unjust enrichment has 
serious limitations as a tool for the fair allocation of 
property between cohabiting spouses. . . . The 
uncertainties that have appeared in the application of the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment may reflect a poor fit 
between its requirements and the realities of domestic 
relationships.97 
 
These equitable claims do not provide cohabitants with an effective 
alternative to the property sharing regime accorded to married spouses 
under Part I of the Family Law Act. 
 
Equitable claims in the context of cohabiting relationships is 
an area of the law that continues to develop. For example, the Kerr v. 
Baranow decision in 2011 established the joint family venture and 
gave new direction to this area of law.98 This development may further 
complicate equitable claims made by unmarried cohabitants. This 
complexity increases the level of uncertainty in the law and, 
consequently, fosters litigation. Given the cost of litigation, some 
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cohabitees refuse to pursue what they would otherwise be entitled to if 
the property sharing regime accorded to married spouses was extended 
to include cohabitees.  
 
Courts may be attempting to fill a legislative void by providing 
cohabitees with a “substitute for [the] non-existence of a family law 
regime for cohabitants.”99 If an opt-out approach were to be adopted in 
Ontario, cohabitees would no longer have to navigate through the 
complex area of equitable claims. Such reform would do away with the 
current piecemeal approach and provide cohabitants with a more 
comprehensive regime. Cohabitants would be able to enter and exit 
relationships aware of their rights and obligations. An opt-out regime 
would provide cohabitants with certainty and predictability in the law.  
  
REFORM IN OTHER PROVINCES: THE APPROACHES 
ADOPTED IN NOVA SCOTIA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
Other provinces have been quicker to address the recent emergence of 
cohabitation, as these unions are increasingly becoming an alternative 
to the traditional family form. It is important to take into consideration 
the approaches adopted in other provinces, such as Nova Scotia and 
British Columbia, and the reasoning behind such reform. The 
approaches taken in the two provinces are fundamentally different, as 
Nova Scotia adopted an opt-in approach, while British Columbia chose 
an opt-out approach. Each province attempts to balance the competing 
goals of autonomy and equality (i.e. the protection of the vulnerable). 
While autonomy is given greater emphasis in the opt-in approach taken 
by Nova Scotia, the reform in British Columbia tends to emphasize the 
protection of the vulnerable. It is important to note that reform in Nova 
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Registered Partnerships: The Approach Adopted in Nova Scotia  
 
In Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, Justice Bastarache makes 
note of the “alternative choices and remedies” available to unmarried 
cohabitants.100 He states that “these couples are also capable of 
accessing all of the benefits of the MPA through the joint registration 
of a domestic partnership under the LRA.”101 Part II of the Law Reform 
(2000) Act, which addresses the scheme for cohabiting couples for the 
purposes of property sharing, came into effect on June 4, 2001.102 
Through this legislation, Nova Scotia adopted an opt-in regime 
whereby an unmarried cohabiting couple could register their domestic 
partnership.103 Upon registration, the cohabitants would have the same 
rights and obligations as “a spouse under the Matrimonial Property 
Act.”104 
 
The adoption of an opt-in regime in the form of registered 
partnerships was a step in the right direction, but it fell short of properly 
recognizing “a diversity of family forms.”105 The shape of the reform 
was surprising, considering the Discussion Paper and Final Report 
released by the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia.106 The 
Commission noted that if the government wished “to encourage and 
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support family life, it must assure a basic level of fairness on the 
termination of marriage and marriage-like relationships.”107 In its final 
report, the Commission took the view “that the existing law regarding 
cohabiting couples is neither clear nor fair, and altering the law to 
provide for only optional coverage of such couples would simply 
perpetuate the existing situation.”108 The Commission expressed the 
notion that an opt-out approach would still respect the value of 
autonomy because “if both parties in a relationship value autonomy 
from legal regulation strongly and equally, they will undoubtedly 
contract out of the Act.”109 In short, the Commission strongly preferred 
an opt-out approach and was of the view that an opt-in approach, such 
as that taken by Nova Scotia, would not resolve the issues faced by 
cohabiting couples after separation. 
 
Extending the Rights and Obligations of Married Spouses to 
Unmarried Cohabitants: The Opt-out Regime of British 
Columbia  
 
Reform has more recently taken place in British Columbia with the 
enactment of the Family Law Act.110 The Act, which has been in force 
since March 18, 2013, adopts an opt-out approach.111 That is, the Act 
defines “spouse” to include both married individuals and unmarried 
cohabitants who have either lived together in a “marriage-like” 
relationship for two years or who have lived together in a “marriage-
like” relationship and have a child together.112 It is important to note 
here that cohabitants must have lived together in a “marriage-like” 
relationship for two years to fall within the scope of the provisions 
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dealing with property and pension division.113 Nonetheless, this 
approach “recognizes the similarities between married and unmarried 
relationships” and “promotes committed family relationships 
regardless of marital status.”114 
 
First, the Civil and Family Law Policy Office recognized that 
“not everyone has a choice about whether or not to marry.”115 The 
example that “a couple may stay together even though one spouse 
wants to marry and the other does not” is used to illustrate this point.116 
An opt-out regime responds to such concerns as it presumptively 
protects the vulnerable party in a relationship where there is a clear 
power imbalance. Second, the standardizing of the expanded definition 
of “spouse” creates “greater consistency in the treatment of unmarried 
spouses in family law generally and across related laws.”117 Lastly, the 
inclusion of cohabitants  
 
in the property division scheme recognizes that the 
number of common-law relationships is on the rise and 
that common-law remedy of constructive trusts 
inadequately protects the interests of this growing 
number of unmarried spouses.118 
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REFORM IN ONTARIO: THE ADOPTION OF AN OPT-OUT 
REGIME 
 
It is interesting to note that 10.9 per cent of all census families in 
Ontario were common-law couples in 2011.119 Although Ontario has 
the lowest rate of cohabitation among Canada’s ten provinces, this 
number will continue to rise. Legislative reform is needed to address 
this emerging family form. Legislation is one of the primary references 
that inform how individuals structure their relationships, both in 
business and in family. Thus, the question now becomes whether 
Ontario should adopt an opt-in approach similar to Nova Scotia’s 
scheme or an opt-out approach similar to recent reform in British 
Columbia. 
 
In 1993, the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) 
released its Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of Cohabitants 
under the Family Law Act.120 The OLRC “concluded that the preferred 
approach was to extend the legislative regime to cohabiting couples, 
requiring those who wished to avoid the legislative regime to opt 
out.”121 The OLRC identified four policy rationales to support its 
conclusion: (1) the functional similarity between marriage and 
cohabitation; (2) “reasonable expectations of family members”; (3) 
“the need to compensate economic contributions to family well-
being”; and (4) “relationships between family law and social assistance 
law.”122 The last of these rationales—relationships between family law 
and social assistance law—is synonymous with the hidden policies 
underlying family law decisions discussed earlier. That is, the OLRC 
identifies the desire to “avoid diverting funds from the public purse in 
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order to support separated individuals” as an opt-out regime would 
provide significant relief for Ontario’s social assistance regime.123 
 
In my view, an opt-out approach should be adopted, as an opt-
in approach, similar to that adopted in Nova Scotia, would “simply 
perpetuate the existing situation.”124 An opt-out regime ensures 
protection of the vulnerable party, or, at the very least, ensures that both 
parties must agree to avoid such obligations. That is, “only an opt-out 
scheme would ensure protection in the absence of positive action by 
the parties.”125 The gap between marriage and cohabitation has 
narrowed over the past fifty years. Cohabitation is a new form of family 
living that should be recognized by policymakers. These policy 
concerns all suggest that an opt-out approach is preferable for future 
reform in Ontario. 
 
The question now is how the term “spouse” would be defined 
in this new approach in Ontario. The definition of spouse included in 
British Columbia’s Family Law Act provides a strong framework and 
a good starting point. The three-year mark in a cohabiting relationship 
seems to be of great significance. “Social science evidence indicates 
that less than half of cohabiting relationships reach this point.”126 In 
fact, approximately one-third will marry and another quarter will 
separate within this time period.127 A three-year threshold will 
therefore provide reasonable grounds to believe that the “trial period” 
has passed.128 Alternatively, and more accurately, this three-year mark 
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can be defined as the point in time in which the community views the 
cohabiting couple as a “family.” This is unless, of course, the 
cohabiting couple have children together prior to this time, thereby 
causing such legal rights and obligations to be extended at an earlier 
date. Accordingly, I propose the following definition of spouse: 
 
1(1) In this Act, 
“spouse” means either of two persons who 
(a) are married to each other, 
(b) have together entered into a marriage that is 
voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a 
person relying on this clause to assert any right, 
or 
(c) have lived together in a marriage-like 
relationship, and 
i. have done so for a continuous period of at 
least 3 years, or 
ii. except in Part 1 [Family Property], have a 
child together. 
 
TESTING THE NEW APPROACH: THE EFFECT OF 
REFORM ON NEVER-MARRIED AND POST-MARITAL 
COHABITANTS 
 
It is important to test the proposed definition of spouse to ensure that it 
establishes a fair regime and strikes the appropriate balance between 
autonomy and the protection of the vulnerable. Given the statistics 
discussed earlier, for the purposes of this paper the effects of the 
proposed reform will be analyzed in the context of four different 
cohabiting relationships: (1) never-married cohabitants without 
children; (2) never-married cohabitants with a mutual child; (3) post-
marital cohabitants without children; (4) post-marital cohabitants who 
have brought children into the relationship. Two groups have not been 
included for the purposes of this paper—never-married cohabitants 
who have brought children into the relationship, and post-marital 
cohabitants with a mutual child. The former is uncommon and the 
effect of reform will be similar to that on group 4. The inclusion of the 





latter would be redundant as the effect of reform would be identical to 
the effect on group 2. The possibility of having both a mutual child and 
a child brought into the relationship will not be considered, as the 
existence of a mutual child is viewed as determinative. 
 
Group 1: Never-married Cohabitants without Children  
 
This situation creates the greatest amount of concern for the opt-out 
approach suggested above. This relationship may be the least 
permanent of the four groups in consideration and the period of 
cohabitation may have the greatest chance of being conceived as a 
“trial marriage.” Furthermore, the cohabitants may have the greatest 
chance of being unfamiliar with the law and the legal obligations and 
rights that would automatically attach upon reaching the three-year 
mark. One may suggest that an opt-in approach may be best suited for 
this group of cohabitants. The three-year mark, however, prevents the 
net from being cast too far. 
 
The similarities between cohabitants and married persons only 
becomes stronger with the passage of time. The intentions of 
cohabitants may change over the duration of their relationship. 
Furthermore, a dependency may develop over time. This is why an opt-
out approach appropriately prevents such vulnerabilities from being 
left unprotected. An opt-out approach considers the needs at the end of 
a relationship more important than the intentions at the beginning. 
 
Never-married cohabitants without children will fall within the 
definition of spouse only if either (a) they choose to marry, or (b) they 
continue to cohabit for more than three years. It is at this three-year 
mark that the law would deem never-married cohabitants without 
children to be living as a family even though they remain unmarried. 
The consequences of not adopting such an approach appear to be much 
more severe than the consequences of adopting this approach. If both 
of the cohabitants wish to avoid such obligations, they are free to 
contract out of such a regime. Not much is lost by providing protection 
for a vulnerable party, especially starting from the presumption that the 





unaware public believes after three years they are considered to be 
married according to the law. 
 
Group 2: Never-married Cohabitants with a Mutual Child  
 
The purpose of an opt-out approach is to appropriately recognize the 
diversity of family forms. Ontario’s Family Law Act intends to provide 
a legal regime for individuals to consider when structuring their 
significant relationships. There is no better an indicator of a family than 
the presence of a mutual child. That is, “one of the strongest indicia of 
an intention to be treated as a family is the existence of children born 
to the couple.”129 Thus, it is a fair presumption that those who cohabit 
and have a child together intend to appear as, and wish to be treated as, 
a family. 
 
A power imbalance is likely to exist in a situation where never-
married cohabitants have a child together. A balance must be struck 
between the wishes of a party to avoid obligations under the Family 
Law Act and equality. This begs the question of what equality actually 
means in the context of a family. One possible explanation is that 
equality within the family begins from the presumption that the 
spouses have contributed equally to the family. The dissolution of an 
intact family unit often unmasks the existence of dependency. Without 
the presumption of equal contribution, the dependent party is 
vulnerable and often exploited.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada took judicial notice of the 
phenomenon of the “feminization of poverty” for post-separation 
women and children.130 There is no reason to suggest that this 
phenomenon applies only to married women. In fact, scholars have 
found that the end of a marriage or a common-law relationship 
increases the likelihood of poverty, especially when children are 
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involved.131 This group of cohabitants is best served and protected by 
an opt-out approach. 
 
Group 3: Post-marital Cohabitants without Children 
 
Post-marital cohabitants are the most likely to be familiar with their 
rights and obligations that arise from Ontario’s Family Law Act. 
Accordingly, this group of individuals can appropriately structure their 
relationships in a manner that is consistent with their intentions. These 
unmarried couples may contract out of the obligations that arise at the 
three-year mark if they wish to do so. 
 
The idea that not everyone has a choice about whether or not 
to marry may be most applicable to this group of cohabitants. This is 
because a cohabitant may refuse to marry because of their previous 
marital experience. Vulnerability is maximized in an opt-in regime 
whereby a couple remains together even though one spouse wishes to 
marry and the other refuses to. The suggested opt-out approach 
overcomes this issue by appropriately placing the onus on the more 
powerful party. At the very least, an opt-out approach provides the 
financially vulnerable spouse with more bargaining power. 
 
Group 4: Post-marital Cohabitants Who Have Brought Children 
into the Relationship 
 
This group of cohabitants is the most complex of the four because of 
the existence of “two families” in one household. That is, at least one 
of the cohabitants is a part of two families. The question then becomes 
whose interests should the approach protect: the current or former 
family. In considering this question, policymakers must balance not 
only autonomy and equality but also the interests of the children 
brought into the relationship and those of the financially vulnerable 
spouse. 
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Children are among the most vulnerable individuals within 
Canadian society. Thus, balancing the interests of the children and the 
vulnerable spouse is a difficult task. One possible resolution is to 
provide the courts with a great deal of discretion when there are 
children brought into the relationship. This, however, adds a layer of 
complexity to the law and would make the law more difficult to 
navigate. Furthermore, giving the courts such discretion creates some 
sense of unpredictability in the law. Thus, if one of the cohabitants 
brings children into the relationship and wishes to protect their 
interests, the onus should rest on that individual to structure their 
relationship accordingly. A cohabitation agreement would provide 





Marriage may no longer enjoy a “uniquely privileged status” in 
Ontario. The social perception of what constitutes a family has changed 
over the past fifty years with the emergence of cohabitation. This 
marked departure from the traditional perception of the family and 
legislative reform are necessary due to the misconception that marriage 
ought to be synonymous with family and the lack of security provided 
to the vulnerable parties in a cohabiting relationship. While marriage 
may signify the formation of a family, married spouses and their 
children are only one variation of the nuclear family. Defined as the 
basic social unit composed of two parents and their children, the 
nuclear family need not be confined to married spouses but should also 
include those who choose to cohabit.  
 
The functional similarity between marriage and cohabitation is 
one of the main pillars supporting the argument for legislative reform. 
Legislative reform has already taken place in many of Canada’s other 
provinces. The family must be redefined in order to reflect changes that 
have occurred to the family over the past fifty years and the new 
variations on the nuclear family. Moreover, this redefinition must be 
reflected in family law policy and the Family Law Act.   
 





One of the many purposes of the law is to regulate social 
behaviour and create a framework within which individuals may 
structure their relationships. The steady rise in the rate of cohabitation 
indicates that cohabitation poses a greater threat to the institution of 
marriage than the high incidence of divorce.132 Without reform, 
cohabitants are left without clear direction as to their legal rights and 
obligations under Ontario’s Family Law Act. An opt-out regime 
eliminates the guesswork that exists currently. 
 
When crafting the new legislation, the Ontario government 
should consider the recent reform in British Columbia. Furthermore, 
policymakers should acknowledge social science evidence and the 
work of legal scholars. Although Nova Scotia chose to adopt an opt-in 
regime, it is important to pay close attention to the findings of the Law 
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia in their Final Report: Reform of 
the Law Dealing with Matrimonial Property in Nova Scotia.133 The 
amalgamation of all this information leads to the simple conclusion that 
an opt-out regime is preferable.  
 
An opt-out approach also finds an effective balance between 
the competing values of autonomy and equality entrenched in the 
Charter. By adopting the expanded definition of “spouse” and the 
three-year benchmark for cohabitants, an opt-out approach provides 
cohabitants with much-needed certainty, predictability, fairness, and 
consistency in the law. Through their inclusion in the property sharing 
regime, cohabitants would no longer have to resort to navigating the 
minefield of equitable claims. Instead, an opt-out approach 
appropriately places the burden on the more powerful party, thereby 
providing the vulnerable party with more bargaining power. 
 
Lastly, it is important to educate the public about such reform 
if it is to take place. This will ease the transition into the new regime 
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by allowing cohabitants to become accustomed to their new legal rights 
and obligations. Familiarity with such reform also has the effect of 
minimizing exploitation and vulnerability. This reform will 
appropriately address the most relevant question in family law—who 
is a family—and recognize that the modern family is no longer limited 
to those who marry. 
